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Foreword 
by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom
In June 2018 I was sitting in a small plane with the 
authors of this issue paper travelling along the European 
Union’s external border in the Aegean Sea. Our first 
destination was the island of Lesbos, described by my 
guidebook as: “a wonderful mix of stunning sea and 
mountain scenery, marble gravel beaches and quirky 
villages”. However, on our arrival it quickly became clear 
that for some people this island paradise had turned 
into a prison. Having survived a journey prompted by 
persecution or poverty, migrants on Lesbos and also on 
Samos had reached safety but not freedom. Their  
hosts, local Greek citizens and national agencies, were 
doing their best to help, but felt let down by their 
European partners. It was clear that years after its peak 
in 2015, the migration crisis was anything but solved.
Our experiences on the Greek islands confirmed our 
decision to support this joint project by the European 
Policy Centre (EPC) and the European Union Institute 
for Security Studies (EUISS). The migration crisis and 
its management at the external border of the European 
Union (EU) touch on core values that the Friedrich 
Naumann Foundation for Freedom (FNF) seeks to 
promote: the protection of human rights and solidarity 
among member states. 
The EU’s southern border is a maritime frontier, and 
this natural obstacle has cost more than 3,000 lives 
per year since 2015. As a former naval officer, I share 
every sailor’s deeply held conviction that the safety of 
life at sea is paramount. Sailors do not discriminate 
when lives are at risk. The EU and its member states, as 
promoters and defenders of human rights, should share 
this philosophy. They must not deter irregular crossings 
by reducing or restricting rescue operations. Rather than 
hiding behind natural obstacles, the EU should provide 
consistent immigration rules and legal pathways. 
Human rights can only be defended and promoted as a 
credible concept if they are universal.
Greece, Italy, and Spain are on the front line of the 
continuing crisis. Their burden in receiving large 
numbers of sea arrivals has not been sufficiently shared 
by other member states. Negotiations about the fair 
distribution of refugees and a reform of the infamous 
Dublin III Regulation has sparked considerable conflict 
among EU member states. As of yet this has not yielded 
any tangible results. Simultaneously, an anti-migrant, 
populist backlash has been seen in the domestic  
politics of many member states. The migration crisis 
has proved to be a serious stress test for the future of 
European integration.
The contributions in this issue paper take up some of the 
most relevant questions arising from this backdrop: How 
has the EU’s border management changed? How did the 
crisis affect the EU’s relations with third countries? How 
could human rights be better protected at the border in 
the future? 
We wholeheartedly support the analyses and ideas 
developed and presented by Katharina Bamberg, 
Francesca Fabbri, Frank Mc Namara and Roderick Parkes. 
Enjoy the read!
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Foreword 
by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Ministry of the Interior
The European project has habitually faced challenges, 
but arguably the past ten years – from the financial crisis 
of 2008 to the political impasse in the aftermath of the 
2015 ‘migration crisis’ – has put a particularly heavy 
strain on the unity, coherence and solidarity of the 
European Union (EU). The challenges highlight not only 
the political rifts between European countries, but also 
a growing interdependence between the EU and third 
countries. In this context, decision-makers are tasked 
with finding solutions to an array of highly complex 
challenges. It is after all at the EU’s external border 
that internal and external aspects of security meet and 
interact, transforming from abstract notions to reality.
The project ‘All things to all men – Geopolitics and 
competing priorities at the EU’s external border’ by 
the EPC and the EUISS focuses on the increasingly 
politicised external borders of the EU – actors, priorities 
and policies. It has become clear that the EU’s border 
management cannot be seen merely as a technical  
home affairs issue. Management of borders, migration 
and asylum are intertwined, and successful policy  
action often begins beyond the EU’s external border. 
While the system of Integrated Border Management 
is based on this reality, there is a demand for more 
discussion about the changes to the EU’s border 
management; their geopolitical implications for the EU; 
and better integration of foreign policy considerations 
into border management.
In contributing to this project, the Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior seek 
to support a Europe-wide debate about the future of 
border management, and, ultimately, to better inform 
policymaking both in member states and at Union level. 
As a first step, the project’s roundtables in Brussels and 
Paris succeeded in gathering an impressive collection of 
experts and stakeholders to participate in the discussion. 
We expect this report to broaden and intensify the 
dialogue even further.
Europe needs good policies for the sake of both  
migrants and border countries, but also – and most 
fundamentally – for the sake of Europe as a whole.
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5Executive summary
In 2015 there was a significant increase in the number 
of migrants crossing the Mediterranean and arriving 
on European shores. The numbers were such that the 
phenomenon became known in the public debate as the 
‘migration crisis’. Numbers have since diminished to 
what is perceived to be a much more manageable level. 
However, the crisis period continues to reverberate 
within European politics and to drive law and policy 
reform. Much of that reform has focused on how the 
European Union (EU) manages its external border and 
especially the role that foreign policy plays in that 
management. The Issue Paper seeks to shed some light 
on the interplay between border management and 
foreign policy, and to make recommendations for a more 
integrated and consistent European approach.
In the first chapter, Frank Mc Namara charts the 
evolution of Integrated Border Management (IBM), the 
concept through which the EU manages its external 
border, and its role in the future of the external border. 
IBM has become increasingly central to the EU’s strategy 
in managing future migration crises. Mc Namara argues 
that foreign policy measures were central to decreasing 
the number of migrants arriving in the EU by sea during 
the recent crisis. However, these initiatives were ad 
hoc and did not reflect the principles of solidarity, the 
fair sharing of responsibility between member states 
and fundamental rights. Recent and envisaged reforms 
seek to better frame future foreign policy action in the 
context of IBM. Nevertheless, those reforms in and 
of themselves cannot preclude future recourse to the 
type of piecemeal foreign policy initiatives that were 
spawned by the previous crisis. Mc Namara argues that 
the prominent position given to IBM in the reforms is 
an opportunity to take a more long-term and principled 
approach to cooperation with third countries. That 
approach would reduce the likelihood of future crises 
arising, simultaneously reducing the need for recourse 
to such makeshift foreign policy initiatives.
In the second chapter, Katharina Bamberg discusses the 
Union’s proposal for a Resettlement Framework, marking 
an attempt to approach resettlement in a systematic, 
structured and sustainable way. However, tensions 
emerged during negotiations reflecting two different 
and conflicting approaches to the purpose of this 
policy instrument. The European Parliament saw it as a 
humanitarian pathway for the most vulnerable, while the 
European Council appeared to wish to use it as migration 
management tool within an increasingly control-oriented 
Common European Asylum System. Bamberg argues that 
turning the Resettlement Framework into an instrument 
of migration management is problematic, in particular 
when it comes to cooperation with third countries. 
The legislative proposal makes EU commitments on 
resettlement from third countries dependent on the 
cooperation of those countries in asylum and migration 
matters, mostly in relation to border control and 
preventing departures. This signals a push to use foreign 
policy to outsource protection responsibilities, and 
ultimately carries the risk of impeding access to asylum. 
Bamberg contends that the traditionally humanitarian 
dimension of resettlement should not be forgotten,  
and that member states should take steps to uphold 
the right to asylum and meet the protection needs of 
vulnerable people.
In the third chapter, Francesca Fabbri evaluates how 
foreign and migration policies can be more effectively 
targeted at achieving European objectives in Libya, 
a country of special significance to both the EU’s 
migration and foreign policy agendas. She provides an 
overview of the Libyan economic and political state 
of play, and identifies priorities to better address the 
challenges on the ground. The analysis then moves to 
assessing the policy approaches put in place by the EU 
and its member states in Libya. Fabbri explains how 
these approaches may have provided quick fixes, but 
have fallen short of delivering long-term solutions 
to both migration and security challenges because 
they did not address the roots of instability. The 
mobilisation of a wide range of development and foreign 
policy instruments for migration control purposes 
in Libya has not advanced the EU’s broader political 
and security objectives in the country. Fabbri offers 
recommendations for a more structural approach to 
achieving stability in Libya and highlights the need 
to integrate foreign and migration policy tools and 
objectives more effectively.
Collectively, the chapters of this Issue Paper acknowledge 
that cooperation with third countries to control migration 
and manage the external border is inevitable. However, 
they argue that the EU must make a number of law 
and policy decisions to enhance the coherence and 
effectiveness of border management and foreign policy 
measures in the pursuit of lasting, sustainable solutions 
that reflect core EU principles. Only by doing so will the 
Union achieve a border management approach that can 
be ‘all things to all men’ in balancing security with respect 
for fundamental rights.
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6List of acronyms
ATCR  Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement
CBL Libyan Central Bank
CEAS Common European Asylum System
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
DDR Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
EBCG European Border and Coast Guard
EU European Union
EUBAM EU Border Assistance Mission
EULPC EU Liaison and Planning Cell
EUTF EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNA Government of National Accord
HoR House of Representatives
IBM Integrated Border Management
IcSP Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IRC International Rescue Committee
IRO International Refugee Organisation
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
LIA Libyan Investment Authority
LNA Libyan National Army
LPA Libyan Political Agreement
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
NOC National Oil Company
SAR Search and Rescue
SFL Stabilisation Facility for Libya
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya
Chapter 1
Frank Mc Namara
Policy Analyst
Integrated Border 
Management and 
migration: A crisis concept 
or a concept in crisis?
Integrated Border Management (IBM) is the concept by 
which the European Union (EU) manages its external 
border. IBM involves national and international 
cooperation between all authorities and agencies involved 
in border security and trade facilitation. Its goal is to 
establish effective and coordinated border management 
at the EU’s external borders.1
IBM can be traced back to 2001 when the European 
Council recognised that the easing of internal frontiers 
required a corresponding strengthening of external 
border control.2 When it was being drafted, large numbers 
of migrant arrivals by sea were not at the forefront of 
policymakers’ minds. IBM was not developed specifically 
to respond to crisis situations per se. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that the integration of external 
border management was undertaken on the basis that it 
should be able to face all eventualities at that border.
What the EU experienced is perhaps better 
described as a crisis of border management 
than a ‘migration crisis’ per se.
The following years saw the number of migrants arriving 
by sea across the Mediterranean remain within a 
relatively low range.3 In 2014 this pattern changed, with 
a large increase in migrants making the crossing to the 
EU. During the second half of 2015 there was a surge in 
arrivals by sea, marking the start of a phenomenon that 
has since been widely referred to as the ‘migrant crisis’ in 
the public debate. It is important to note that that term 
‘crisis’ is contentious in this context.4 The EU certainly 
experienced a very significant increase in the number 
of irregular migrants arriving by sea via the Eastern 
Mediterranean and, to a much lesser extent, the Central 
Mediterranean route, in 2015. However, levels increased 
during a relatively brief period (2015–2017) and even at 
their height were dwarfed in comparison with the figures 
for refugee populations and other migrants scattered 
across the world, including in the EU’s neighbourhood. 
What the EU experienced is perhaps better described as a 
crisis of border management than a ‘migration crisis’ per 
se. The EU’s border management regime was unable to 
adequately respond to the significant increase in arrivals 
of migrants by sea. In these circumstances, the concept 
which underpins external border management must be 
considered afresh.
This paper considers the foreign policy response to the 
crisis in the context of IBM. It also examines how recent 
and envisaged reforms, undertaken in response to that 
crisis, have better equipped the external border for future 
crisis situations. These reforms include an overhaul of 
Frontex, the external border agency, and a reimagining of 
IBM. Part of the latter has included the incorporation of 
strong reference to certain core EU principles – notably 
fundamental rights; solidarity; and the fair sharing of 
responsibilities between member states.5 The disconnect 
between these principles and the foreign policy measures 
adopted in response to the crisis serves as a reference 
point throughout this paper as it charts the Union’s 
efforts to crisis-proof its external border. However, as the 
paper sets out, there is a limit to what the EU can do to 
shape future foreign policy to reflect those principles. 
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8The evolution of IBM
This section considers the evolution of IBM in terms of 
how it interacts with third countries, and with regard to 
the principles that have recently been given increased 
prominence vis-à-vis the external border.
THE FOREIGN POLICY COMPONENT
The foreign policy aspect of IBM went without any 
detailed clarification until the aforementioned JHA 
Council Conclusions of 2006 set it out. It was then 
expanded on in subsequent policy guidelines.10 IBM’s 
foreign policy role is stated to relate to two areas: 
measures that are taken in third countries, and 
cooperation with third countries. The measures taken 
within third countries include advice and training by 
liaison officers and travel document experts. Cooperation 
with third countries consists of the exchange of 
information and the establishment of appropriate 
communication channels, plus central, regional and local 
contact points and emergency procedures.11
The EBCG Regulation (2016) incorporated a strong 
foreign policy component within IBM, stipulating 
“cooperation with third countries in the areas covered by 
this Regulation” as one of its defined components.12 This 
cooperation focuses on “neighbouring countries and on 
those third countries which have been identified through 
risk analysis as being countries of origin and/or transit 
for illegal immigration”.13 As will be described below, the 
2018 proposal for reform of Frontex proposes a further 
expansion of cooperation with third countries within the 
framework of IBM.
Cooperation with third countries in this field dates back 
to the early 2000s, when the Western Balkans became the 
first laboratory for IBM. The aim was to establish a fully 
integrated system of border management for the Balkans, 
encompassing intra-service cooperation, alongside 
inter-agency and international cooperation. IBM has 
also been promoted in third countries through EU Border 
Assistance Missions (EUBAMs) in Moldova, Ukraine, Libya 
and at the Rafah Crossing Point (between the Gaza Strip 
and Egypt). While the objectives of each of these missions 
has differed, border security has been central to each of 
them.14 The rationale has been that tighter border control 
in neighbouring third countries will have the positive 
effect of reinforcing the EU’s external border further 
downstream, and will prepare those third countries for 
closer ties with the Union.15
This is because there remains a jealously guarded 
national prerogative for foreign policy in this field.
IBM – A BRIEF BACKGROUND
IBM was developed following the easing of internal 
borders through the incorporation of the Schengen 
Agreement into EU law with the Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1999). The European Council believed that all segments 
of the external border (at each of the relevant member 
states) would require more integrated management as 
this new era of co-dependency on entry of persons began. 
In May 2002 a Commission Communication responded to 
the aforementioned requirement by the European Council 
by introducing IBM.6
IBM was not materially considered at the time that 
Frontex, the agency tasked with managing the Union’s 
external border, was established. In fact, Frontex’s 
founding Regulation (2004) made no reference to IBM, 
merely stating that the agency was being established 
with a view to improving “the integrated management 
of the external borders” of the European Union.7 It was 
the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council Conclusions 
of 2006 that further refined IBM and introduced the 
‘dimensions’ which would demark the framework.8  
These dimensions incorporated a strong foreign  
policy component.
Frontex and IBM both evolved slowly and separately for 
about a decade after those JHA Council Conclusions, 
and it was only with the onset of the crisis in 2015 that 
radical and fast-paced reform began to take place. That 
reform has seen the future of Frontex become much more 
entwined with the role of IBM. 
It is useful to note as a preliminary point that Frontex 
remains the agency tasked with management of 
the external border but has been referred to as the 
European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) in recent 
reforming legislation. The EBCG Regulation (2016) 
provided Frontex with unprecedented new powers and 
expanded significantly on IBM. This was followed by the 
Commission’s ambitious EBCG proposal in September 
2018, which built further on its predecessor with another 
expansion of powers for Frontex and for the Commission. 
The new proposal also set out IBM in greater detail than 
ever before. In addition to the 2018 EBCG proposal, 
Frontex is currently readying itself for a further 
reorganisation of IBM with a technical and operational 
strategy due to be published in the coming months. At 
the same time, national authorities are drafting their 
own strategies for IBM.9 Taking stock of the recent 
crisis is particularly appropriate at this time, when new 
policies are in the process of being formulated. Such an 
examination provides a basis for considering the extent 
to which current reforms will enable the EU and member 
states to better respond to future crisis situations.
9The rationale has been that tighter border 
control in neighbouring third countries 
will have the positive effect of reinforcing 
the EU’s external border further 
downstream, and will prepare those third 
countries for closer ties with the Union.
The promotion of IBM in third countries has not been 
without criticism. It has been suggested that such 
promotion was inappropriate as the concept had not yet 
been fully developed nor harmonised at the EU’s own 
external borders. Its promotion at the external borders of 
third states has thus been contentious.16 Despite this, IBM 
is now an important element of EUBAM missions, where 
it is repeatedly referred to as a strategy that should be 
promoted.
In addition to the interactions described above, IBM 
is more loosely associated with other foreign policy 
initiatives which still clearly come within the scope of 
the concept since they concern cooperation with third 
countries in an area covered by the EBCG Regulation 
(2016).17 The organisation of the return of third-country 
nationals who are subject to a deportation order and  
the assigning of Immigration Liaison Officers to airports 
in third countries are examples of such initiatives. 
It is less clear whether the foreign policy initiatives 
undertaken during the crisis fall within the scope of 
IBM’s foreign policy component. These initiatives are 
considered below.
While these principles were not 
prominently present in IBM’s foundational 
texts, they are now increasingly informing 
EU policy towards the management of its 
external border.
HOW THE EU’S FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
FIT WITH MANAGING ITS EXTERNAL BORDER
Solidarity, the protection of fundamental rights and the 
fair sharing of responsibilities between member states 
are all principles of EU law. While these principles were 
not prominently present in IBM’s foundational texts, they 
are now increasingly informing EU policy towards the 
management of its external border.
Frontex’s founding Regulation (2004) made reference 
to the central role of solidarity, a theme that is 
continued in the EBCG Regulation (2016) and the 
EBCG proposal (2018).18 The 2016 Regulation also 
significantly expanded its references to the protection 
of fundamental rights, something that had been 
only briefly acknowledged in the Frontex founding 
Regulation (2004). The EBCG proposal (2018)  
continues in this vein. Frontex’s founding Regulation  
did not refer to the principle of the fair sharing of 
responsibility between member states.19 The EBCG 
Regulation (2016) has a specific provision dedicated to 
‘Shared Responsibility’. This states that Frontex will 
“implement European integrated border management as 
a shared responsibility of the Agency and of the national 
authorities responsible for border management”.20
The growing importance of these principles can be 
gleaned from several significant policy documents. In  
May 2015, a few months before the crisis got fully 
underway, the Commission issued a Communication 
entitled ‘A European Agenda on Migration’.21 This 
was effectively a rallying cry for achieving a common 
European migration policy. It did not make any 
reference to IBM. In May 2018, however, a post-crisis 
Commission Communication (progress report) on the 
implementation of the European Agenda on Migration 
was issued.22 This report dedicated a whole annex to 
IBM and was at pains to emphasise the centrality of 
the fundamental principles in underpinning European 
IBM.23 It stated that the “principles of solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibilities between Member States… 
should be fully integrated into” the development of IBM. 
It added that IBM should also guarantee the full respect 
of fundamental rights in all border management and 
included an explicit reference to respect for  
non-refoulement.
In summary, policy and legal developments over recent 
years have increasingly emphasised the role of key 
principles in framing and guiding the evolution of IBM. 
These principles were, however, conspicuously absent  
in the foreign policy initiatives which brought about the 
end of the significant numbers of sea arrivals between 
2015 and 2017.
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 Fig. 1 
Foreign policy and the rise and fall of a crisis
In 2015 over a million people arrived in the EU  
via the Eastern and Central Mediterranean routes,  
with roughly 85% using the Eastern route. Migrant  
flows along these routes have fallen dramatically  
since then, and it is projected that the figures for 2018  
will not exceed 5% of the 2015 high. Foreign policy  
was instrumental in bringing about this massive  
decrease in the number of sea arrivals along  
both routes. 
Decisive foreign policy action effectively 
ended the crisis, leading to quite sudden 
month-on-month falls along both routes.
Decisive foreign policy action effectively ended the crisis, 
leading to quite sudden month-on-month falls along 
both routes, as shown in the accompanying graph, below. 
While these policy measures were effective, questions 
may be asked as to how they fit with the aspiration to 
develop IBM, and whether they can be considered as a 
sustainable course of action in responding to possible 
future crises.
THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
The second half of 2015 and the first three months of 
2016 marked the peak period for arrivals in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The vast majority of 2015 sea arrivals 
(91%) reached Europe between July and December of  
that year. This sustained influx continued until spring 
2016, with 151,452 people arriving in the three months  
to the end of March. By comparison, a comparatively  
modest 21,998 people reached Europe’s shores via  
this route from April to December. This drop in sea 
arrivals coincided with a unique instrument of foreign 
policy – the EU-Turkey Statement.24
The German government was a key driving force  
behind the complex negotiations that led to the  
signing of the Statement.25 A number of different  
factors have been cited in explaining the decline of  
sea arrivals in 2016. Notable among these was the closure 
of several crucial borders in the Balkans.26 However, the 
EU-Turkey Statement should be recognised as being 
the primary reason for this decrease. In achieving the 
objective of decreasing the flow of migrants through this 
deal, appropriate standards of democratic and judicial 
oversight were compromised. The way in which the 
Statement fitted into wider international treaty-making 
was also unclear.27 
Furthermore, there were questions about who was 
actually party to the deal. After it had been agreed, the 
EU released a press release which stated that: “the EU 
and Turkey today decided to end the irregular migration 
from Turkey to the EU”.28 Nonetheless, in February 2017, 
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in a controversial ruling, the General Court of the EU 
found that it was not the Union but its member states – as 
actors under international law – who had conducted the 
negotiations and come to an agreement with Turkey, and 
the Court thus found that it lacked jurisdiction to review 
the Statement.29 
The adoption of an important foreign policy decision 
through a press release has been heavily criticised as 
being inconsistent with the democratic and judicial 
checks and balances that would normally accompany 
such an agreement.30 Furthermore, the Statement has 
been criticised for putting the fundamental rights of 
migrants at risk.31 Finally, solidarity and a fair sharing of 
responsibility among member states, principles to which 
the Union aspires, were sorely lacking in the lead up to 
the Statement. 
THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN
A smaller but still significant increase in migrant numbers 
occurred in the Central Mediterranean in 2014, leading 
to a peak of 181,436 arrivals in 2016. In early 2017 it 
looked as if the annual total would outstrip the figure for 
2016, but in July there was a significant drop in numbers 
and arrivals via this route have been on a downward 
trajectory ever since. Between January and July 2018, 
18,510 migrants arrived via the Central Mediterranean, 
representing a more than five-fold decrease compared 
with the same period in 2017. The route thus experienced 
a very clear month-on-month drop-off in the same  
way that the Eastern Mediterranean did following the  
EU-Turkey Statement.
A number of factors are commonly mentioned as possibly 
having influenced the decrease in arrivals by sea along 
the Central Mediterranean route. Foremost among 
these are the restrictions placed on the work of NGOs 
and the renewed activities of the Libyan Coast Guard. 
Successive Italian governments have been hostile to 
the work of NGOs that set out to rescue migrants in the 
Mediterranean. However, it has been convincingly argued 
that the activities of NGOs did not materially impact 
the number of people departing from Libya and were 
therefore not a factor in the number of arrivals by sea in 
the EU.32
The reassertion of sovereign control over Libyan waters 
by the Libyan Coast Guard has also been mentioned as 
a factor, with Italy and the EU providing material and 
expert assistance.33 The controversial ‘pull-backs’ by the 
Libyan Coast Guard have certainly contributed to making 
the journey to Europe a more difficult prospect for 
migrants in Libya.34 However, it is extremely difficult to 
quantify the impact of these operations on the number of 
sea arrivals in the EU.
It is impossible to definitively measure the impact of 
the policies restricting the work of NGOs, or the Libyan 
Coast Guard’s interceptions, in stemming the flow of 
people leaving Libyan shores. They certainly did not 
represent the same type of single defining moment as the 
EU-Turkey Statement did in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Instead, the closest thing to such an intervention was the 
Italian foreign policy efforts that took place in Libya. In 
the absence of a properly functioning central government, 
these involved informal bilateral agreements with the 
Government of National Accord, as well as allegedly 
coming to opaque arrangements with key non-state 
actors on the ground.35 Any such deal with non-state 
actors places the fundamental rights of migrants at 
risk. It is also clear that such foreign policy approaches 
resulted from a failure of solidarity and the fair sharing of 
responsibility among member states. Italy felt compelled 
to act alone in order to stem the migrant flow that it was 
faced with. As with the EU-Turkey Statement, the foreign 
policy measures allegedly employed to stem the flow via 
the Central Mediterranean route do not lend themselves 
to institutional oversight and judicial safeguards.
REACTION TO THE CRISIS – IBM’S  
CONTINUED EVOLUTION
Foreign policy has played a crucial role in the response of 
the EU and its member states to the rise in the number of 
migrants arriving by sea via both the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean routes. The reaction to the crisis reflected 
an external border that was not equipped to deal with sea 
arrivals on such a large scale. Foreign policy responses 
were focused on gaining control over these arrivals, and 
came at the cost of fundamental rights, solidarity, and the 
fair sharing of responsibility among member states.
Foreign policy responses were focused 
on gaining control over these arrivals, 
and came at the cost of fundamental 
rights, solidarity, and the fair sharing of 
responsibility among member states.
This crisis experience has forced the EU to embark 
on a reform of Frontex to better prepare the external 
border for any future crisis. Published shortly after the 
EU-Turkey Statement, the 2016 EBCG Regulation gave 
IBM unprecedented prominence, strengthening its role 
in shaping Frontex’s future crisis response. The EBCG 
Regulation was clearly conceived as a framework by which 
future crises could be more effectively handled than had 
previously been the case. In this regard, the continued 
inclusion of the principles of solidarity, the fair sharing of 
responsibility and fundamental rights is very important. 
As described above, references to those principles had 
been limited in the Frontex founding Regulation (2004). 
Proposed reforms of Frontex took centre stage in 
Commission President Juncker’s State of the Union 
address in September 2018.36 As currently envisaged, the 
proposed EBCG Regulation would provide for a standing 
corps of 10,000 operational staff by 2020. They would 
rely first and foremost on the agency’s own equipment, 
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In its early days, IBM could be described as being a  
vague piece of Euro-jargon. Despite this it was – in theory 
at least – the concept by which the EU’s external border 
was supposed to be managed. The primary response of 
the EU to the migration crisis has been to reform Frontex, 
and the inclusion of IBM in that reform is significant. 
It is difficult to say with certainty what impact IBM’s 
incorporation into the Regulation will have, but it can 
be interpreted as a signal that responses to future crises, 
should they occur, should be better framed by shared 
principles. The inclusion of IBM at the heart of the reform 
of Frontex should thus be taken as a positive development 
for foreign policy in crisis situations.
One of the primary goals of the proposed 2018 
reforms of EBCG must be to underscore the EU’s firm 
commitment to democratic and judicial oversight. This 
would help to regulate future crisis-driven foreign 
policy to ensure that it is in line with the customary 
oversight for international treaties which are already 
subject to, for example, the Court of Justice’s review 
on fundamental rights compliance. The question is 
how effectively such oversight can be brought to bear 
on foreign policy which is organised on an informal 
basis, rather than being enshrined in a treaty. The 
deals allegedly carried out by Italy in Libya are a prime 
example, as this kind of deal-making is tremendously 
difficult to supervise. The preferred approach must be 
to manage the external border in a way that means such 
deals are unnecessary.
It is better to prevent the need for  
knee-jerk foreign policy in response  
to a crisis than to attempt to regulate 
policies which do not live up to the  
Union’s standards and principles.
It is better to prevent the need for knee-jerk foreign 
policy in response to a crisis than to attempt to regulate 
policies which do not live up to the Union’s standards 
and principles. Avoiding ad hoc policy responses requires 
a long-term perspective on crisis prevention, rather than 
simply focusing on short-term objectives when reacting 
to a situation that is already unfolding. The inclusion 
of IBM in the proposal for reform of Frontex (EBCG 
Regulation 2018) represents an opportunity to set new 
standards for all cooperation with third countries. The 
challenge in grasping that opportunity is in resisting the 
temptation to pursue sticking-plaster solutions that may 
provide temporary relief from the immediate pressure of 
arrivals, but do so only at the cost of adhering to the EU’s 
standards and principles. Achieving a more long-term and 
holistic response will require a concerted effort across all 
migration-related foreign policy to try and prevent crisis 
situations from arising.
rather than member states’ vessels, planes and vehicles. 
Among the most far-reaching and contentious elements 
contained within the proposal is a provision that would 
delegate important power to the Commission in the 
event of a member state’s failure to adopt the necessary 
measures during a crisis.37 In such situations, the 
Commission could decide, without the consent of the 
relevant member state, that an intervention by Frontex’s 
border guards was necessary. The Commission would also 
have the power to assert that internal border controls 
should be reintroduced for that member state. Assigning 
new powers of this nature to the Commission, without 
any check from the Council, is an ambitious starting point 
for the proposal.38
More importantly in the current context, the Commission 
states that the proposed Regulation would herald 
stronger cooperation with non-EU countries.39 Subject 
to the agreement of relevant third countries, the agency 
would be able to deploy its staff in joint operations 
with them, even beyond territories neighbouring the 
EU. Unlike the 2016 EBCG Regulation, this proposal 
includes IBM in its provision for cooperation with third 
countries. The relevant section opens with the words: 
“the Member States and the Agency shall cooperate with 
third Countries for the purpose of integrated border 
management and migration policy”.40
Article 72(3) adds that both Frontex and the member 
states must comply with Union law, “including norms 
and standards which form part of the Union acquis”, 
when cooperation with third countries takes place on the 
territory of those countries. Article 73 covers bilateral and 
multilateral international agreements including those 
relating to cooperation at an operational level. 
Article 73(3) requires that such agreements be subject 
to “Union and international law on fundamental rights 
and on international protection”. It adds that when 
implementing such agreements member states should 
“continuously assess and take into account the general 
situation in the third country”.
Finally, Article 77(3) states that member states must 
notify the Commission of any existing bilateral and 
multilateral agreements and it “shall verify whether their 
provisions comply with this Regulation”. There is a clear 
intention that all future agreements will have to abide by 
Union standards and principles. This reform resonates 
when considered against the backdrop of the agreements 
which brought an end to the crisis.
Conclusion
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The EU Resettlement 
Framework: A new 
migration management 
tool and its foreign policy 
implications
Following the migration management crisis of 2015-16,1 
the European Union (EU) set out to reform the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS). Among the policy 
goals put forward was the harmonisation of asylum 
standards across member states, combined with a desire 
to make the policy framework more robust in the face 
of large-scale migration flows. One of the approaches 
considered was resettlement: that is, the transfer of 
individuals processed as eligible for international 
protection from an asylum country to another state, 
with the aim of permanent settlement.2 
To date, the Union’s resettlement efforts have taken 
the form of voluntary schemes, with members pledging 
their commitment on an ad hoc basis.3 Following on 
from these voluntary arrangements, proposals were put 
forward to organise resettlement in a more structured 
and systematic manner.4 A new policy instrument 
appeared on the European agenda: the EU Resettlement 
Framework. One of its aims is to offer a safe alternative 
to individuals in need of international protection before 
they resort to dangerous crossings via the Mediterranean. 
When introducing the Resettlement Framework proposal, 
Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos stated that the EU 
was “opening a genuine legal window in our efforts to 
close the irregular backdoor”.5
The European Commission presented its legislative 
proposal during the summer of 2016, and the European 
Parliament adopted its position in autumn 2017 on the 
basis of a report by MEP Malin Björk.6 The European 
Council’s mandate for negotiations followed shortly 
afterwards,7 and negotiations began in December 2017.
Following five scheduled trilogue meetings,  
negotiations broke off during summer 2018 without 
official agreement between the institutions being 
reached. This was partly because of the – as yet 
unfulfilled – aim of reaching a package deal with other 
files of the CEAS.8 But more significantly, negotiations 
were stalled by a clash of positions on resettlement. These 
differences mainly relate to differing perspectives on the 
concept of resettlement as either a humanitarian pathway 
or a migration management tool, as will be reviewed in 
further detail in this chapter.
This chapter starts by summarising the historical context 
of resettlement policies and looks at how resettlement 
made its way onto the EU policy agenda. It also touches 
on the different attitudes towards resettlement, which 
became more pronounced as negotiations on the 
Framework proposal progressed. In a second section, it 
explores the extent to which the proposal is developing 
into a tool for migration control. It examines the most 
controversial provisions in the Commission’s proposal, 
namely those that relate to the exclusion or deterrence 
of individuals in need of international protection. 
In particular, it examines the use of conditionality 
in ensuring the cooperation of third countries with 
resettlement. It concludes by looking at the extent to 
which resettlement is moving away from its traditional 
role as a humanitarian pathway to become a migration 
management tool.
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Resettlement in the EU: A new direction?
This section provides a brief history of resettlement and 
its evolution at a global level. It then focuses on the EU’s 
resettlement efforts, in particular the two ad hoc schemes 
of 2015 and 2017. Afterwards it describes the negotiations 
between the Council and the European Parliament on the 
Resettlement Framework proposal, outlining the most 
contentious points of the discussions.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Resettlement has been a component of migration policies 
in one way or another since the two World Wars. Following 
the foundation of the International Refugee Organisation 
(IRO) in 1946, resettlement and repatriation helped large 
numbers of refugee groups in and beyond Europe gain 
protection. Four years later, and with the IRO subsumed by 
the newly founded United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), resettlement became a primary tool for 
protecting refugees internationally.
Following the Vietnam War (1955–1975) and the 
resettlement of large groups of Vietnamese refugees in 
the 1970s and 80s, states’ support for resettlement shifted 
to individual cases and became more systematic.9 This 
approach was significant in the context of conflicts in 
the Middle East in the 1980s; the first Gulf War (1991); 
the collapse of Yugoslavia (1992); and the Kosovo War 
(1999). During these conflicts, states increasingly looked 
to UNHCR to identify, submit and resettle refugees, 
and the UN refugee agency thus began developing 
specific resettlement criteria.10 From 1995, Annual 
Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR) began. 
These became an essential platform for states, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), and international 
organisations to cooperate on resettlement.11 They 
also promoted the tripartite structures underlying 
resettlement. Under these structures, UNHCR usually 
identifies and processes individuals for resettlement, 
while states provide permanent sites of residence, 
and NGOs assist with identification, pre-departure 
procedures, and post-resettlement integration.
CURRENT TRENDS
Today, the number of individuals in need of resettlement 
continues to grow, most recently as a result of the Syrian 
War (from 2011 onwards). Both the number of countries 
participating in resettlement schemes, and the diversity 
of resettlement programmes, including humanitarian 
admission and private sponsorships, have increased.12 The 
number of worldwide departures peaked in 2016, with 
close to 130,000 individuals resettled out of a projected 
1,150,000 global resettlement needs.13 Of these, however, 
only a tenth were resettled to European countries 
under national programmes, with the UK, Norway and 
Sweden resettling the highest number of individuals.14 
By contrast, states such as Liechtenstein, Poland and 
Romania did not resettle any asylum seekers at all.15 
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The EU has administered two ad hoc resettlement 
schemes, one in 201516 and a second in 2017.17 The 
2015 scheme led to the resettlement of close to 23,000 
individuals, while the more recent plan aims to resettle 
50,000 individuals over a period extending to October 
2019. As of September 2018, the schemes have led to the 
resettlement of 38,000 persons to EU member states.18 
These schemes marked the first time that resettlement 
policies had been formally coordinated at EU level with 
member states contributing through voluntary pledges.
It has the potential to offer a safe route 
to asylum for individuals in need of 
international protection, and to provide  
a real alternative to dangerous crossings 
via the Mediterranean.
THE DEBATE ON THE  
RESETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK
The Commission’s proposal for a Resettlement 
Framework represents a significant departure from 
previous approaches. Running in parallel with national 
programmes, the EU Framework is not an ad hoc 
resettlement scheme such as those introduced in 2015 
and 2017. As such, it represents an attempt to develop 
a more systematic and structured way of managing 
resettlement at EU level. It has the potential to offer 
a safe route to asylum for individuals in need of 
international protection, and to provide a real alternative 
to dangerous crossings via the Mediterranean. At the 
same time, the Framework proposal is consistent with  
the EU’s aim of both reducing uncontrolled migration  
and strengthening the capacity of legal pathways,  
on the basis of which governments can monitor the 
profile and the total number of individuals in need of 
international protection.
During negotiations on the file, the Council and 
Parliament clashed on a number of issues. At their core, 
these clashes can be boiled down to a disagreement on 
the very nature of resettlement efforts.
The Council, on the one side, underlined the potential 
of resettlement as “a strategic instrument to manage 
migration flows”.19 This acknowledged that in addition 
to humanitarian and values-based considerations, states 
have various motivations for resettlement including 
strategic geopolitical considerations in first countries of 
asylum; foreign policy interests; and border management 
goals.20 The Council also emphasised the voluntary nature 
of resettlement as a priority during the negotiations. 
This was largely influenced by the political fallout and 
ensuing discord between European countries in response 
to mandatory quotas for the EU relocation schemes.21 
Member states previously showed considerable reluctance 
to commit to relocating refugees from Italy and Greece, 
and to follow up on their commitments. The initial aim 
was to relocate 160,000 individuals, but this number was 
later reduced to around 98,000, of which a final 32,000 
were relocated.22 
Moreover, the Council pushed for a widening of the scope 
of the Framework to include humanitarian admissions, 
which it argued should be on an equal footing with 
resettlement, albeit with a more limited set of guarantees 
and rights than those associated with the latter. The 
Council also highlighted the strategic and geopolitical 
objectives of migration management that resettlement 
could contribute to. More concisely, the Council’s position 
emphasised that the “resettlement framework is part of a 
well-managed migration policy”.23
Finally, it insisted on the inclusion of a conditionality 
element when collaborating with third countries on 
resettlement, thereby creating a strong link between 
the EU’s commitment to resettlement and the 
overall cooperation of third countries on migration 
management. In this regard, the Council sees an 
opportunity to reduce incentives for irregular migration, 
in particular through the expansion of protection 
systems in those third countries.
Similarly, some member states see a control-based 
approach to resettlement as an important means to tackle 
a number of more general migration management issues. 
Andres Anvelt, Minister of the Interior for Estonia, stated 
for instance, that resettlement would “help decrease flows 
to our own external borders, disrupt the business model 
of smugglers and balance the efforts done in other fields, 
for example in returns”.24 
The Parliament, on the other side, stressed the 
humanitarian character of resettlement and set explicit 
quotas for resettlement and humanitarian admissions. 
In addition, and in direct opposition to the Council’s 
position, it consistently posited resettlement as a 
durable solution for refugees and underlined that the 
“strategic use of resettlement should not be interpreted 
as migration control or used as a means to achieve the 
Union’s foreign policy objectives”.25 
Similar to the Parliament’s position, UNHCR has stressed 
the need to preserve the traditional role of resettlement 
as a humanitarian pathway and protection tool for the 
most vulnerable. The UN refugee agency also emphasised 
that resettlement should complement other ways of 
migration and not prevent the spontaneous arrival of 
refugees and other migrants.26
Civil society organisations have also voiced strong 
concerns. In their view, the EU is attempting to create 
a system that controls and reduces migration, rather 
than building sustainable and accessible pathways to 
asylum in the Union.27  For NGOs, the initial mention 
of ‘maximum’,28 rather than ‘minimum’ numbers of 
resettlement beneficiaries, has been a particularly 
contentious issue. Furthermore, the fact that member 
states’ resettlement commitments would be voluntary has 
fuelled uncertainty as to whether the Framework could 
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Resettlement: Deterring asylum seekers?
The following section looks more closely at contentious 
provisions of the proposal that aim to discourage 
spontaneous arrivals to the EU or deter asylum seekers 
from accessing resettlement more generally. To illustrate 
these, Article 6 of the Resettlement Framework proposal, 
‘Grounds for ineligibility’, will be discussed in more detail. 
Article 6 of the proposed legislation, ‘Grounds for 
ineligibility’ (labelled ‘exclusion’ in the legislative 
proposal prior to negotiations), specifies that “persons 
who have irregularly stayed, irregularly entered, or 
attempted to irregularly enter the territory of the member 
states during the five years prior to resettlement” shall be 
excluded from targeted Union resettlement schemes. As 
such, the text excludes migrants and refugees who self-
initiated their journey from resettlement. 
This is particularly interesting in the context of 
discussions on ‘disembarkation platforms’, a concept 
first floated by the Council and Commission in the spring 
of 2018. While the precise legal nature and practical 
delivery of these platforms remains uncertain, they are 
perceived as centres in third countries where migrants 
would be disembarked after being intercepted by search 
and rescue missions in the Mediterranean.30 Following 
disembarkation, individuals would either be returned 
to their country of origin or resettled in the EU, with an 
explicit reference to the Resettlement Framework.31 But 
bearing in mind that the legislation proposes excluding 
people from resettlement who have attempted to enter 
the EU irregularly, it is clear that there is a discrepancy 
between these two migration management tools. 
Accentuating this, the Commission further specified that 
resettlement would not be available to all disembarked 
individuals in need of international protection and 
that, in any case, resettlement would not be limited to 
Europe.32 This raises the question of whether the EU 
would create new legislation to cover other pathways, 
including guarantees to protect those individuals who 
would not be eligible for resettlement to Europe.
The eligibility criteria also illustrate the proposal’s 
portrayal of resettlement as an alternative, exclusive 
form of migration, designed as an instrument to 
discourage spontaneous migrant arrivals. During the 
trilogues, the Parliament was particularly critical of 
such punitive ineligibility grounds. This led to the term 
‘exclusion’ being replaced by ‘ineligibility’ to avoid the 
misinterpretation that this would mean exclusion from 
asylum, rather than ineligibility for resettlement.
Moreover, including an ‘integration potential’ criterion 
to admit or refuse candidates for resettlement has proved 
very contentious during the negotiations. As such, 
integration potential could simultaneously serve as a 
rewarding criterion, by enabling resettlement, or as a 
punitive criterion, by being used as grounds for exclusion 
from resettlement. In the end, member states would thus 
be able to select candidates on the basis of their perceived 
potential for integration, a development that once again 
attests to a migration management approach in this part 
of the legislation. The Council was in favour of citing a 
lack of integration prospects in Article 6 as a reason for 
ineligibility for resettlement. Such a lack of integration 
prospects could, for instance, be found in a refusal to 
participate in pre-departure orientation. The Parliament 
has vigorously opposed this, stressing the importance of 
the right to asylum and arguing that protection should 
not be made conditional on one’s integration potential. 
Concerns about taking integration potential into account 
have been flagged up before in proposals for business-
led resettlement schemes,33 while the perceived ability 
to integrate has been used as a more or less formal 
selection criterion by some member states. In these cases, 
however, certain groups are frequently exempted from the 
integration potential criterion based on their protection 
needs and vulnerability, and the rule is not necessarily 
used as a reason to exclude someone from resettlement.34
In the end, the integration potential 
criterion could lead to discriminatory 
practices in selecting candidates for 
resettlement and potentially undermine 
member states’ obligation to resettle those 
who are most vulnerable.
With this clause in the Resettlement Framework, it would 
be the first time the EU would be in a position to condition 
access to protection (in this case through resettlement) on 
integration potential. Including this as a criterion could 
give preference to certain individuals over some of the 
most vulnerable persons or groups, especially since the 
Commission’s proposal does not clearly define how this 
would relate to vulnerability and other eligibility criteria. 
In the end, the integration potential criterion could lead 
to discriminatory practices in selecting candidates for 
resettlement and potentially undermine member states’ 
obligation to resettle those who are most vulnerable.
become a sustainable channel to asylum, especially given 
the substantial global resettlement needs.29 
In what follows, the chapter looks first at the eligibility 
grounds included in the Resettlement Framework 
proposal that could deter asylum seekers from accessing 
protection through resettlement. In a next step, the 
chapter focuses on those provisions that could outsource 
protection responsibilities to third countries.
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Resettlement: Outsourcing protection 
responsibilities?
The following section looks more closely at the 
involvement of third countries in managing the 
EU’s resettlement efforts, as described in Article 4 
of the legislative proposal on ‘Countries from which 
resettlement is to occur’. More importantly, it traces 
how the legislative text establishes an unbalanced 
relationship based on the concept of conditionality. 
Article 4 was the focus of particular debate between the 
Council and the Parliament during discussions about the 
EU’s cooperation with third countries in the context of 
migration management. 
RESETTLEMENT IN THE EU’S RELATIONS  
WITH THIRD COUNTRIES
The proposal for a Resettlement Framework mirrors 
the EU’s increasing reliance on partnerships with third 
countries in the context of migration management. 
With regard to the external dimension, resettlement was 
mentioned briefly in the 2016 Partnership Framework 
communication as a way for the EU “to discourage 
irregular and dangerous journeys”.35 
Resettlement was also an important part of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, stipulating that for every asylum seeker 
returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, a European 
member state would resettle a Syrian refugee. Moreover, 
all new irregular arrivals to EU territory after the 
conclusion of the Statement would be returned to Turkey. 
In exchange for receiving these individuals, Turkey would 
be paid a total of EUR 6 billion. However, rather than 
fulfilling their pledges of resettling individuals in need of 
international protection in the EU, member states created 
what has become a deterrence mechanism aimed to keep 
migrants and asylum seekers in Turkey.36 
Resettlement was picked up again in the joint 
communication on Libya entitled ‘Migration on the 
Central Mediterranean Route: Managing flows, saving 
lives’ of January 2017, where the Commission raised 
the possibility of including the resettlement of persons 
in need of international protection in the EU’s overall 
approach to managing migration on this route.37 The 
Resettlement Framework proposal signals the next step 
in the EU’s efforts to involve third countries in migration 
management more closely by making use of the concept 
of conditionality in its cooperation with these countries 
on migration management.
Conditionality has played a central role 
in the EU’s foreign policy towards third 
countries since the end of the Cold War.
CONDITIONALITY IN THE EU’S RELATIONS 
WITH THIRD COUNTRIES
Conditionality has played a central role in the EU’s 
foreign policy towards third countries since the end of the 
Cold War. In 1998 it was described by Smith as connecting 
“perceived benefits for another state… to the fulfilment of 
conditions relating to the protection of human rights and 
the advancement of democratic principles”.38 Since then, 
the role of conditionality has moved beyond a focus on 
human rights.
In the EU context, conditionality was applied most 
strikingly during the accession process for Central 
European states in the 1990s and 2000s, when the EU 
linked accession to political transformation of potential 
member states. More recently, conditionality also played 
a crucial role in the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy 
towards countries in North Africa and the Middle East, 
with the underlying aim of, inter alia, migration control.39 
Following the migration management crisis, this 
approach was embedded further in the EU’s Migration 
Partnership Framework of 2016. With the Framework, 
the EU seeks to adopt migration compacts with third 
countries of origin and transit in Africa and the Middle 
East. The aim is to reduce irregular migration by, among 
other things, addressing root causes and accelerating 
returns.40 In exchange, third countries can benefit from 
facilitated mobility for their citizens, for instance by 
means of visa provisions or mobility partnerships.
As such, conditionality in migration control is now based 
on the premise of third countries controlling irregular 
migration movements towards the EU. This also relates 
to the basic understanding of an incentive- based 
relationship, either linked to ‘carrots’ (positive incentives) 
or ‘sticks’ (negative incentives).41 A number of concerns 
have been expressed regarding this often imbalanced 
These punitive or exclusionary criteria reflect a more 
general desire among member states to apply greater 
selectivity to their resettlement programmes. The criteria 
would provide a tool to discourage spontaneous (and in 
the member states’ views, uncontrolled) arrivals. This 
could then lead to a more targeted and streamlined 
migration management process. In short, ineligibility 
criteria create an instrument for greater migration control 
for member states, and as such represent a departure 
from the core humanitarian character of resettlement.
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relationship, both with regards to practical elements and 
credibility, such as concerns about ethical issues and 
human rights questions.42
More generally, the EU has previously been criticised 
for its disregard for human rights when shifting 
responsibility for migration management outwards to 
third countries. UN Special Rapporteur François Crépeau’s 
2013 report on the management of the EU’s external 
borders and its impact on human rights was critical 
of illegitimate detention; a shifting of responsibility 
for migration control to third countries; and capacity-
building and support of foreign border controls with 
little regard for human rights. He also criticised the 
externalisation of border controls through readmission 
agreements and push-backs of migrants.43 The European 
Parliament and development NGOs have repeatedly 
stressed that aid in particular should not be conditional 
on cooperation with migration management, as this runs 
the risk of diverting funds away from poverty reduction.44 
Moreover, using development aid to tackle the ‘root 
causes’ of migration can also be misguided, for instance 
in the case of displacement following political conflicts.
This spells out a way for the EU to use 
resettlement as leverage in policy and 
political dialogues with third countries.
CONDITIONALITY IN THE  
RESETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK
Discussions on a controversial conditionality clause, 
introduced in the Resettlement Framework proposal, 
have slowed down progress on the file. Article 4 on 
‘Regions or third countries from which resettlement is 
to occur’, specifies that third countries’ ‘overall relations’ 
with the Union in the area of migration and asylum will 
be an important factor on which the Commission will 
base its choices of regions or third countries from which 
resettlement should take place. During negotiations, the 
European Parliament strongly opposed this conditionality 
clause and argued that the proposal had to reflect the 
humanitarian character of resettlement more strongly. 
Disagreement with the Council on this issue became 
one, if not the main, stumbling block of the trilogues. 
For the Council, this article is of great importance in 
ensuring that the Resettlement Framework forms “part of 
a well-managed migration policy”.45 During the trilogues, 
the institutions agreed that the selection process 
would also take UNHCR projected global resettlement 
needs into account,46 as was traditionally the case in 
national resettlement programmes. They also agreed 
that member states would still rely on UNHCR for 
referral of candidates. Nevertheless, the inclusion of a 
conditionality clause making resettlement dependent on 
functioning partnerships with countries in the region is 
new. This spells out a way for the EU to use resettlement 
as leverage in policy and political dialogues with third 
countries. NGOs in the field have widely criticised the 
EU for making a commitment to resettlement hinge on 
the cooperation of third countries.47 Their criticism goes 
back to the central issue of preserving resettlement as a 
humanitarian tool and a durable solution for refugees, 
instead of employing it for migration deterrence. In 
their view, making the EU’s commitment to resettlement 
conditional on the cooperation of third countries 
significantly compromises the humanitarian impact of 
this pathway.
The legislative proposal specifies that resettlement 
should also be based on a ‘third country’s effective 
cooperation’ with the Union in the area of migration and 
asylum. More specifically, cooperation will be measured 
against each country’s efforts to reduce the number of 
third-country nationals crossing the EU’s border from 
its territory. The third countries will also have to create 
the conditions under which asylum applicants can be 
returned to them. This would include a further expansion 
of the use of the first country of asylum and safe third 
country concepts. Moreover, the proposal calls on third 
countries to develop an effective asylum system to 
increase their capacity for reception and protection of 
persons staying in their territories. Lastly, increasing the 
rate of readmission and return through the conclusion of 
readmission agreements would also constitute an aspect 
of ‘effective cooperation’ on the part of the third country. 
SHIFTING THE FOCUS OF  
RESETTLEMENT COOPERATION
Member states’ general approach to cooperation with 
third countries on migration management is the basis 
for the interpretation of Article 4. Resettlement has a 
logical role to play in alleviating pressure on countries 
that experience difficulties when hosting refugees. But 
making resettlement conditional on a third country’s 
broader cooperation on migration and asylum would be 
problematic, and far from helpful for countries already in 
distress.48 Such an approach could significantly shift the 
EU’s attention towards countries that cooperate well on 
migration management more generally, rather than to 
those that are hosting large populations of individuals in 
need of international protection. 
In particular, this article can be interpreted as an 
instrument for member states to exert influence on 
third countries more generally, even more so to the 
extent that it links cooperation on resettlement with 
the receipt of development aid or EU assistance in other 
areas. This becomes clear when looking at the criteria 
for countries that should be prioritised for resettlement 
schemes, as mentioned in Article 4. Collaboration on 
resettlement seems to depend more on compliance 
with the criteria listed in the legislative text than on 
other considerations, such as the individuals actually 
processed for resettlement in the country in question. 
This further detracts from the humanitarian objectives 
of resettlement and invites a much stronger focus on 
restrictive migration management elements, such as 
returns and readmissions.
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Moreover, this also puts the EU and the Resettlement 
Framework in a position of being dependent on the 
cooperation of third countries in managing irregular 
migration movements. This is problematic for two reasons: 
q First, conditions on the ground can change rapidly, 
creating new conflict situations that lead to individuals 
needing international protection. If the EU genuinely 
wishes to establish a more structured and systematic 
response to protecting displaced people, it should 
also consider the robustness of the Resettlement 
Framework. Making it dependent on the cooperation 
of third countries that may be susceptible to instability 
can reduce its reliability.
q Second, it puts the EU in a comparatively disadvantaged 
negotiating position vis-à-vis third countries. One of 
the EU’s migration management priorities relates to 
improved border management in countries of origin 
and transit, so that irregular movements to the EU 
territory can be reduced. Yet the resettlement of a few 
thousand people out of countries under high migratory 
pressure will not make a significant difference to those 
countries, and could indirectly shift responsibility to 
protect to external partners. Therefore, the EU should 
expect significant demands from these third countries 
and, being dependent on their cooperation, will not be 
in the best negotiating position. 
These considerations show how quickly resettlement 
could take on a considerable geopolitical dimension in 
the EU’s effort to manage migration, moving it very far 
from its origins as a humanitarian pathway.
It is also unclear to what extent third countries would be 
incentivised to reform their asylum systems and border 
management in order for the EU to agree to commitments 
on resettlement. As of now, there is no clarity concerning 
the form that other incentives might take. It is however 
likely that the EU will link the Resettlement Framework 
with other initiatives under the EU’s Partnership 
Framework on Migration with third countries. In that 
case, these initiatives and the Union’s incentives 
would have to be tailored to the third country’s specific 
situation, something the Resettlement Framework does 
not currently foresee. This is problematic because it 
could lead to resettlement being further conditioned on 
third countries’ cooperation, for instance with regards to 
development aid.
TACKLING THE ROOT CAUSES?
The use of conditionality in development aid with the 
aim of reducing migration to the EU’s territory – in 
particular by means of readmission agreements or 
migration compacts within the European Neighbourhood 
Policy – has been widely criticised by civil society 
actors. According to NGOs, these policies do not take 
into account that a ‘root cause’ for migration can be 
political unrest in third countries,49 in which case the 
use of development aid would not only be misplaced, 
but also exacerbate imbalances in the relations with 
such countries at the expense of migrants.50 The 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) has also warned 
about a possible shift of focus from asylum countries 
with pressing resettlement needs to countries that 
would be cooperative under the conditions laid down 
in the Resettlement Framework. According to the IRC, 
“ignoring pressing needs in [locations facing protracted 
displacement situations] in favour of those of short term 
political interest may lead to the creation, exacerbation 
and spill-over of crises with longer term consequences  
for the EU”.51 
The Resettlement Framework proposal also draws on 
controversial considerations, such as the ‘first’ country 
of asylum or a ‘safe’ third country. These apply when 
defining the conditions for the return to third countries 
of asylum seekers that have irregularly entered the EU. 
The 2016 EU-Turkey Statement is an example of how 
such an exchange with a designated safe third country 
could work in practice.52 Although some doubts have 
been raised regarding this,53 the Statement was credited 
with significantly reducing the number of people trying 
to reach the EU via Turkey, and was seen as a success by 
the EU and many member states.54 Yet, concerns have 
been raised about the lawfulness of returning individuals 
from the Greek islands to Turkey.55 This is mainly due to 
Turkey still maintaining the geographical limitation of 
the original Geneva Convention, and, as such, excluding 
non-Europeans from qualifying for refugee status. In 
particular, this applies to nationality groups such as 
Syrians, Afghans or Iraqis who can only access temporary 
protection in Turkey. The level of protection and support 
that individuals in need of international protection 
receive in Turkey has also been scrutinised, in particular 
following claims of arbitrary detention, push-backs and 
physical violence against asylum seekers.56
The strategic use of the safe third country 
concept has the potential to make the 
situation on the ground for refugees  
more difficult and, somewhat 
paradoxically, less safe.
Civil society organisations have heavily criticised how the 
‘safety’ condition is rendering resettlement dependent 
on cooperation with countries that have allegedly 
established safe conditions.57 This would mean that 
third countries that are deemed to offer safe conditions 
for the return of refugees and asylum seekers would be 
prioritised for resettlement schemes. Reliance on the ‘safe 
third country concept’ is problematic,58 particularly with 
regard to how the EU would deal with a deterioration of 
conditions for asylum seekers in such supposedly safe 
countries. As described by Frelick et al., externalisation 
of migration control could seriously threaten the ability 
to protect the rights of asylum seekers in particular. For 
example, a person may be denied asylum because he or 
she could have sought protection in a safe third country 
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Recommendations
The Resettlement Framework represents an effort  
by the European Union to address resettlement in a 
systematic, structured and sustainable way. It has the 
potential to shape the future of resettlement at EU  
level. In its optimal form, it would provide a safe way  
for individuals in need of international protection to 
access asylum in the member states.
However, the focus on resettlement as a potential 
migration management tool could lead to a  
significant shift away from its traditional role as  
a humanitarian pathway. This evolution is  
problematic for several reasons: 
q First, it shifts the geographical focus (sometimes 
quite literally) to a selection of regions. Focusing 
exclusively on areas that seem most ‘affected’ by 
uncontrolled migration risks neglecting countries 
that might not be in a position to benefit from 
institutionalised resettlement, but still have 
particularly vulnerable refugees. 
q Second, it discriminates between individuals 
in need of international protection. During 
negotiations between the European Parliament 
and Council, the UNHCR resettlement criteria were 
added to the Resettlement Framework proposal. 
However, there is still a high risk of access to 
prior to reaching the EU.59 In addition, this provision also 
raises the question of whether third countries would be 
deprioritised for resettlement schemes if they could not 
prove they had established conditions that would make it 
safe for individuals in need of international protection to 
be returned there.
This strategic use of the safe third country concept has 
the potential to make the situation on the ground for 
refugees more difficult and, somewhat paradoxically, 
less safe. Establishing the Resettlement Framework 
with the aim of moving away from ad hoc measures and 
uncontrolled migration movements is not consistent 
with resettlement options that could be at the mercy of 
changing conditions in third countries.
Two intermediate conclusions can be drawn from this 
particular article. First, member states are pursuing a 
migration management approach based on conditional 
cooperation with third countries on resettlement. Second, 
this quid-pro-quo approach of linking resettlement with 
third countries’ compliance in managing the EU’s external 
border contributes further to an externalisation of the 
EU’s borders and migration management.60 
THE IMPACT ON PROTECTION POSSIBILITIES 
IN THIRD COUNTRIES
This move to an externalisation of migration 
management is problematic as it will have an impact 
on where refugees can access asylum.61 Where border 
and migration controls prevent refugees from seeking 
asylum in a regular way, they usually create more 
perilous channels through which vulnerable individuals 
will seek protection. As Basheska and Kochenov 
outline in the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations, 
“[by] making migration de facto impossible through 
legal channels, the EU necessarily promotes irregular 
migration flows”.62 One of the Council’s main objectives 
in creating an EU Resettlement Framework is to provide 
safe and legal pathways to the EU.63 However, the 
Resettlement Framework could actually reinforce the 
trend of individuals resorting to perilous ways to access 
protection. This applies in particular to conditionality 
elements in the proposal that make resettlement more 
restrictive by cooperating with third countries on 
migration management. Relying on conditionality in 
resettlement to sustain the EU’s relations with third 
countries could eventually reinforce the harmful and 
dangerous contexts in which individuals are trying to 
access protection today. 
In this context, it is also important to consider the 
threat to the right to protection for individuals who are, 
through such EU legislation, de facto prevented from 
leaving a state to subsequently apply for asylum in the 
EU.64 This could hurt the principle of non-refoulement, 
i.e. the prohibition to expel, return, or in any other 
way transfer a refugee to the country of origin or any 
other country where his or her life or freedom would be 
under threat.65 Conversely, the right to leave a country 
is not an absolute right and can be exceptionally 
restricted in a proportionate manner for reasons of 
national security, public order, public health and the 
freedom of others.66 Yet this is only permissible if the 
principle of non-refoulement is not compromised, and 
therefore it is centrally relevant for the role of the EU 
and of third countries in preventing an individual in 
need of international protection from coming to the 
EU.67 As Markard has argued, “where would-be migrants 
risk persecution or severe human rights violations in 
the third country that would oblige the member state 
to provide protection, preventing them from leaving 
would constitute an abuse of right”.68 Such pre-emptive 
measures in the form of cooperation with third countries 
in the context of resettlement could indeed have a grave 
impact on an individual’s chances of accessing asylum 
in the EU and the right to leave any country, including 
their own.
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asylum being impeded for those who may not meet 
the resettlement criteria, and who are not in a 
position to access protection via other channels. 
For instance, some individuals may be ineligible 
for resettlement on the grounds of vulnerability or 
family reunification. Equally, they may have tried to  
reach Europe in an irregular fashion, which could be 
a basis for exclusion from Union-led resettlement. 
At the same time, they may have been persecuted 
in their countries of origin, and have the right 
to protection as refugees. The exclusionary and 
deterring elements of the Resettlement Framework 
would make it difficult for these individuals to gain 
asylum in any way.
The conditionality clause that has been included in 
the Resettlement Framework, and which links the 
cooperation of third countries on asylum and  
migration to EU commitments to resettlement,  
leads to particular issues:
q First, the EU should not base its relationships with 
third countries on the control or prevention of 
onward migration to Europe. This is problematic as 
it creates a context in which the processing of asylum 
applications could be geographically refocused on 
third countries altogether.  
q Second, the EU should not outsource protection 
responsibilities to third countries that frequently 
have more limited resources or a less stable political 
context to offer a durable solution for refugees 
in their territories. Resettling a limited number 
of individuals will not significantly improve the 
situation on the ground for third countries. It 
is therefore doubtful that they would see added 
value in investing in migration management for 
the EU with little return, aside from comparatively 
few resettlement transfers out of their territories. 
The Resettlement Framework could also prioritise 
resettlement out of third countries that cooperate 
more generally on migration management. This risks 
the exclusion of regions and individuals that would 
need resettlement the most. Moreover, it would be 
even more problematic if, in an attempt to make 
cooperation more attractive, the EU chose to link 
development aid and commitments to resettlement 
to third countries’ cooperation in preventing onward 
movements.69 Both conditionality aspects and 
possible incentives should be seen critically.
In summary, the Resettlement Framework proposal 
is part of an ongoing shift from a values-based to an 
interest-based approach to managing migration and 
providing asylum. The proposed legislation illustrates 
the evolution of thinking about resettlement from a 
primarily humanitarian pathway to one that is strongly 
focused on migration management. From a Realpolitik 
perspective, cooperating with third countries on 
migration management might be effective in reducing 
the number of migrants coming to the EU, including 
those in need of international protection. However, 
this approach is likely to postpone and even exacerbate 
migration issues that the EU will have to face eventually, 
and is thus short-sighted. Furthermore, it is not 
consistent with the legal and ethical standards  
described above. 
The EU Resettlement Framework could be a great 
opportunity to pragmatically address this challenge 
without sacrificing the humanitarian origins of 
resettlement. To do so while effectively reducing the 
number of irregular migrants crossing its borders, the EU 
would need to significantly increase channels of regular 
and safe migration, in particular for those seeking 
international protection. Resettlement of particularly 
vulnerable individuals therefore needs to be increased 
and their protection status guaranteed, not only to 
support a values-based and humanitarian approach, but 
also to protect the strategic interests of member states. 
With no compromise in sight between the Council and 
the Parliament, it remains to be seen to what extent 
the Resettlement Framework will successfully meet 
increasing protection needs, rather than merely proving 
to be a short-sighted migration management tool.
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Francesca Fabbri
Policy Analyst
The migration crisis and 
the stabilisation of Libya: 
Managing priorities at 
Europe’s external border
The state of play in Libya: A perfect storm of 
conflict and migration crisis 
Since the revolution of 2011, Libya has been in constant 
upheaval. It is in the grip of a political stalemate between 
competing authorities in Tripoli and the east of the 
country. Across most of its territory, and particularly in 
the west and south, lawlessness, fighting, lack of access 
to resources and dire economic conditions prevail. 
Rivalries that erupted at the time of the 2014 House of 
Representatives (HoR) elections resulted in political 
European policies relating to Libya have mainly 
sought to reduce the number of migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean. This reflects an increasing tendency in 
Europe to look at foreign policy towards Africa through 
the lens of migration. However, a careful assessment of 
the most recent developments on the ground shows that 
such a focus on short-term aims has been detrimental 
to the key objective of stabilising the country, as well as 
of providing long-term solutions to the management 
of irregular migrant flows. This chapter evaluates how 
foreign and migration policies can be more effectively 
targeted at achieving European objectives in Libya.
Libya is a particularly relevant case study for highlighting 
the complex interactions between foreign and migration 
policies. The country occupies a key border position 
on the Central Mediterranean migrant route. Its 
economy has unravelled, insecurity is widespread, 
and clashes between opposing factions are recurrent. 
Chronic instability in Libya has generated significant 
political, security and economic challenges which the 
European Union (EU) has struggled to cope with. A 
variety of factors, including differences between member 
states – notably Italy and France – combined with the 
competing influences of other external actors, such as 
Russia, Algeria, Egypt, and the Gulf States, have frustrated 
the search for structural solutions.
This chapter begins with an overview of the Libyan 
economic and political state of play, and identifies 
priorities to better address the challenges on the 
ground. The analysis then moves to assessing the policy 
approaches put in place by the EU and its member 
states in Libya. It explains how these approaches may 
have provided quick fixes, but have often fallen short 
of delivering long-term solutions because they did not 
address the roots of instability. In particular, the chapter 
describes how the use of a wide range of instruments for 
migration control in Libya has failed to advance the EU’s 
broader political and security objectives in the country. 
The final section offers policy recommendations for a 
more structured approach to achieving stability in  
Libya. The recommendations highlight the need to 
integrate foreign and migration policy tools and 
objectives more effectively. 
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fragmentation at national level and widespread conflict. 
The ensuing negotiating process led by the United 
Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) delivered the 
Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in 2015.1 Its goal was 
to unify the country’s fragmented political, economic 
and military bodies, but it failed to overcome political 
paralysis, which is deeply rooted in the failures of the 
2011 revolution. 
The body that was created following the LPA, the 
Government of National Accord (GNA), is the 
international community’s main partner, but has only 
limited control over Tripoli’s surroundings.2 It is also 
in constant competition with the eastern institutions 
controlled by General Khalifa Haftar. The current UN 
envoy in Libya, Ghassan Salamé, has been trying to find a 
way to break the stalemate and provide a constitutional 
basis for shared nationwide institutions. 
In June 2018, at a high-level conference in Paris hosted 
by President Emmanuel Macron of France, the leaders of 
the competing Libyan authorities accepted that elections 
would take place in December 2018. This was based on 
a belief that they represented the only way to generate 
the necessary legitimacy to overcome the stalemate. 
But the discussions failed to agree the constitutional 
framework and rules under which the elections would 
take place, and did not address the underlying cleavages 
driving conflict in the country. As a result, the prospect 
of holding an election receded significantly during the 
following months. Recent crises in June3 and September 
20184 highlighted the precariousness of the status quo and 
the importance of efforts to renegotiate security, political 
and economic arrangements. At the same time, grievances 
relating to ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, 
neglected by the Gaddafi regime, remain present. In the 
south, resentment over unequal access to citizenship 
rights for the Tuareg and the Tebu, combined with 
competition over economic resources and the collapse  
of institutions, has had a particularly detrimental effect 
on instability.
It is also widely agreed that addressing Libya’s 
unravelling economy is key to stabilising the country.5 
As a nation Libya is potentially wealthy, and it could also 
create jobs for migrants from Africa as it did before the 
revolution. Largely dependent on oil trade revenues, Libya 
had a GDP of USD 74.77 billion in 2010. However this 
figure had dropped by more than half to USD 34.7 billion 
the following year.6 Its economic deterioration not only 
relates to the sharp decline in oil production and exports, 
but also to inflation and the lack of access to liquidity. 
High levels of volatility on the ground are of course a 
major brake on prospects for economic recovery.
Before the overthrow of the dictator Mu’ammar Gaddafi 
it was estimated that Libya hosted 2.5 million migrants 
on its territory, mostly from Africa, but also from Asian 
countries.7 Of these, 600,000 were regular workers and 
between 750,000 and 1.2 million were irregular. Since 
then, Libya has increasingly become a transit country to 
Europe, but stabilisation could, at least in part, reverse 
this trend. The political stalemate and ongoing violence 
are contributing to a worsening economic situation 
in which different actors – individuals, communities 
and militias – compete for control of economic 
activities, smuggling routes, resources, infrastructure, 
and institutions such as the National Oil Company 
(NOC), the Libyan Central Bank (CBL) and the Libyan 
Investment Authority (LIA). This ‘war economy’8 
mainly works through the sale of commodities and 
goods through smuggling; rent-seeking practices; the 
use of extortion; and predation of state resources. It 
fuels itself through a protracted lack of governance and 
puts the population under strain. At the same time, a 
liquidity crisis and the lack of imports have driven price 
inflation across many products. In this context, human 
smuggling is a critical component of Libya’s economy, 
with estimated revenues of USD 978 million in 2016, 
equivalent to 3.4% of Libya’s 2015 GDP.9 European 
efforts to curb migration, particularly those aimed at 
supporting socio-economic development at a local level, 
thus need to take into account the powerful financial 
incentives that drive actors to get involved in human 
smuggling. It is also worth noting that the European, 
Italian-led, ‘cash-for-migration-control’ policy, has 
repeatedly contributed to the emergence of an anti-
smuggling business through the co-option of militias, 
again to the detriment of stabilisation efforts.10
It is clear that there is no easy pathway 
to stabilising Libya. While the search for 
a political solution is a necessary step, it 
cannot be achieved without reversing the 
economic deterioration and the predatory 
war economy.
It is clear that there is no easy pathway to stabilising 
Libya. While the search for a political solution is a 
necessary step, it cannot be achieved without reversing 
the economic deterioration and the predatory war 
economy. As the international community seeks to 
support these efforts, the links between development, 
migration and security become central. Policies that 
are highly focused on limiting the number of migrants 
getting to European shores have been applied without 
taking into account the consequences for the economy. 
More concretely, involving militias in fighting human 
smuggling is reportedly strengthening the role of 
warlords and undermining parallel European and 
international efforts to create unified national security 
structures.11 At the same time, as the recent outbreak 
of hostilities around Tripoli in September has shown, 
greater efforts should be directed towards reconciling 
armed groups at a local level, and municipalities should 
be given a bigger role in re-establishing functioning 
governance structures and reconverting the economy.  
The EU and its member states should consider all these 
factors in pursuing a comprehensive approach to Libya, 
both to stabilise the country and to deal with migration 
and security challenges on its territory.
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The European approach to Libya: High stakes, 
growing engagement
The European Union’s approach to the Libyan crisis has 
remained fundamentally unchanged since 2014, at least 
on paper. Confirming the key orientation expressed by the 
Political Framework for a Crisis Approach,12 the Foreign 
Affairs Council concluded in July 2017 that “there is no 
solution to the Libyan crisis through the use of force” and 
reiterated its support for the LPA and the GNA as the only 
legitimate political interlocutor.13 Simultaneously, Libya 
has become an increasingly important partner for the 
EU in the field of migration, and collaboration with the 
UN-backed GNA deepened following the adoption of the 
Joint Communication on the Central Mediterranean route 
and the Malta Declaration in January and February 2017 
respectively. These documents form the basis of the EU’s 
approach to migration in the Central Mediterranean and 
mainly focus on the objective to reduce migration flows 
and fight human smuggling and trafficking networks.
Italy has played a pivotal role in shaping 
the EU’s approach to Libya in light of its 
historical ties with the country, its interests 
related to oil and gas imports, and its 
concerns regarding migration.
Italy has played a pivotal role in shaping the EU’s 
approach to Libya in light of its historical ties with the 
country, its interests related to oil and gas imports, and 
its concerns regarding migration. At the same time, 
France has often intervened in matters related to Libyan 
reconciliation, as the meeting convened by President 
Macron in June 2018 illustrates. France’s political support 
for the leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the 
east,14 General Haftar, who is competing with the GNA, 
has put it at odds with the diplomatic efforts of other 
countries, notably Italy. These dynamics have made 
it even more difficult to adopt a consistent European 
approach to the Libyan crisis.15 
The EU has repeatedly expressed its desire to find a 
solution to the political crisis and thereby stabilise Libya. 
However, the instruments put in place suggest that its 
focus has been on curbing migration flows instead. The 
EU has earmarked EUR 266 million for Libya under the 
EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), most of it 
since January 2017. Building on the May 2015 European 
Agenda on Migration,16 the EUTF was officially set up 
at the Valletta Summit on Migration of November 2015 
and supported activities in the Migration Partnership 
Framework of June 2016. This framework envisaged the 
conclusion of new agreements with key third countries 
targeted at addressing migration.17 
The EUTF was set up to provide a rapid, flexible and 
effective response to the emergency situation ensuing 
from the ‘migration crisis’. It focuses on three priority 
areas: the Sahel and Lake Chad; the Horn of Africa; 
and the north of Africa, of which Libya is part. In 2016, 
it provided EUR 26 million for Libya, a figure that then 
represented the biggest allocation within the whole of 
the North Africa Window. It supported projects focused 
on the protection of migrants; humanitarian repatriation; 
reintegration of vulnerable migrants; and on stability and 
resilience through supporting Internal Displaced Persons 
(IDPs) in Libya. 
The EUTF budget was boosted in 2017, and in that year 
alone EUR 200 million was allocated to new projects 
in Libya. This increase builds on the priorities set by 
the European Commission in the Joint Communication 
‘Migration on the Central Mediterranean route:  
Managing flows, saving lives’ of January 201718 and 
further developed by the Malta Declaration of 3 February 
2017.19 These policy documents responded to the increase 
in arrivals along the Central Mediterranean route that 
was recorded in 2016.20
As a result of this increase, a programme worth 
EUR 92 million entitled ‘Managing mixed migration  
flows in Libya through expanding protection space  
and supporting local socio-economic development’  
was adopted by the European Union. This has two  
sub-components.21 The first pillar allocates 
EUR 50 million to humanitarian protection. The  
second pillar, with an envelope of EUR 42 million,  
“aims at fostering socio-economic development at 
municipal level and support local governance, in order  
to better integrate migrants and refugees, and to stabilize 
host communities”. Among the goals listed, reference is 
made to activities that would “contribute to preventing 
potential further movement of migrants or potential 
displacement of host communities, by enhancing local 
socio-economic conditions and promoting cohesion 
and by offering alternative economic opportunities for 
persons involved in smuggling and trafficking activities  
or tempted to do so”. 
The scope of activities envisaged under this second 
pillar is increasing. A new programme of EUR 50 million, 
‘Recovery, stability and socio-economic development’ 
has been developed by the European Commission 
and Italy and implementation will start in November 
2018.22 This aims “to improve the living conditions and 
resilience of vulnerable populations (including migrants, 
refugees, Internally Displaced Persons, returnees and 
host communities) and support local governance, 
in particular in the municipalities most affected by 
migratory flows, by enhancing access to basic and social 
services”. These initiatives aim to focus on municipalities 
as legitimate interlocutors, close to citizens and able 
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The focus on migration and precarious solutions
The various measures outlined above include some 
relevant approaches to reducing instability in Libya, 
such as supporting municipalities and fighting organised 
crime in a more comprehensive way than just focusing 
on human smuggling. Measures include arrest warrants 
against a smuggling ring with links to the Italian 
mafia and organised crime in Libya and Malta, and the 
inclusion of fuel smuggling in the MoU signed by Italy 
and Libya, as well as in the revised mandate of the 
EU naval operation Sophia. The involvement of local 
actors through EUTF programmes is another useful step 
towards addressing migration-related challenges.  
Since interlocutors with effective authority over the 
entire country are absent, there is a need to engage  
with municipalities to support some degree of 
governance and restart Libya’s economy, at least in  
some parts of the country. 
The issue of migration has dominated 
the EU agenda towards Libya. While 
flows of people from Libya to Europe 
have decreased sharply since 2017,28 the 
country’s security crisis continues to 
unfold and the roots of instability have not 
been adequately addressed.
On the whole, however, the issue of migration has 
dominated the EU agenda towards Libya. While 
flows of people from Libya to Europe have decreased 
to manage rapid-impact stabilisation projects such 
as creating job opportunities, restructuring local 
services, and reinforcing educational infrastructure. A 
complementary programme, co-financed by the EUTF and 
Italy, of EUR 46 million was adopted in July 2017 and is 
implemented by the Italian Interior Ministry.23 It aims to 
reinforce the integration and humanitarian protection of 
migrants, along with the border management capacities 
of Libyan authorities. The beneficiaries include the Libyan 
Coast Guard, Libyan maritime authorities, and Libyan 
border guards in the south. As part of this programme, 
a capacity-building pilot project has been set up in the 
Ghat area to restore or establish border area surveillance 
facilities. An operational centre has also been planned 
in this context. However, at the time of writing, the 
identification of local needs still has to be carried out  
and discussions with local partners to allow delegations 
from Tripoli and Italy to visit Ghat and its surroundings 
are ongoing.  
The EU also supports stabilisation in Libya using 
the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 
(IcSP). This currently finances 13 projects worth 
EUR 36.8 million supporting conflict mediation;24 
providing electoral assistance; and contributing to 
the reconciliation efforts of the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the Stabilisation Facility 
for Libya (SFL).25 The IcSP also supports the EUTF 
programmes by screening project proposals to  
make sure that they adequately take into account 
conflict dynamics. 
Besides the EUTF and the IcSP, EU-Libya cooperation 
involves a variety of security and border management 
facilities aimed at addressing migration. Frontex’s 
operation Triton and the EU Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) operation EUNAVFOR MED 
Sophia have been patrolling in the Mediterranean 
since 2014 and 2015 respectively. Deployed in May 
2015, operation Sophia conducts anti-smuggling 
activities, carries out search and rescue tasks in cases 
of need and provides training and capacity-building 
to the Libyan Coast Guard. Its activities have been 
under discussion lately. In the summer of 2018, Italy’s 
newly formed populist government started pushing 
for a change to operation Sophia’s mandate to stop its 
vessels offloading migrants in its ports.26 The EU Border 
Management Mission (EUBAM Libya), based in Tunisia 
but with an increasing presence in Tripoli, provides 
additional support (advising, training and mentoring) 
to Libyan security forces to strengthen their capacity 
in the fields of border management and security. 
An expert from Frontex and another from Europol 
have been deployed to EUBAM Libya. An EU Liaison 
and Planning Cell (EULPC) provides further military 
planning and intelligence capacity to the United Nations 
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) – the integrated 
political mission mandated to support reconciliation, 
the implementation of the LPA and the security and aid 
activities of the international community. In addition 
to these instruments, the Seahorse Mediterranean 
Network aims to create a secure platform to exchange 
information between the Mediterranean countries 
on migration flows and illicit trafficking.27 It also 
contributes to the training of the Libyan Coast Guard. 
As well as these EU-level activities, Italy also bilaterally 
supports the Libyan authorities in the field of migration. 
In February 2017, a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) was signed between the then Italian Prime 
Minister Paolo Gentiloni and Fayez Sarraj, the head 
of Libya’s GNA. The MoU saw Rome pledge support in 
the form of training, equipment and funds to help the 
Tripoli government improve border security on the 
coast and in the south, and to fight the smuggling and 
trafficking of human beings.
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The way forward and implications for foreign and 
migration policies
As the previous section has shown, the EU’s agenda 
regarding Libya is mainly driven by the goal of 
reinforcing its borders and curbing migration flows. 
While these are legitimate objectives, the actions put 
in place to date mainly reflect the externalisation of 
domestic concerns. Recent elections in key member 
states have shown that the perceived threat of migration 
dominates political discourse in the EU.31 The failure 
to achieve a Europe-wide consensus on migration has 
deepened the political crisis around this issue and has 
led to increasing polarisation both among and within 
member states. 
The failure to achieve a Europe-wide 
consensus on migration has deepened the 
political crisis around this issue and has 
led to increasing polarisation both among 
and within member states. 
At the same time, policymakers in individual member 
states have sought to prevent the rise of nationalist 
political parties by increasingly adopting restrictive 
migration policies. The case of Italy and Libya is a clear 
example. The MoU signed with the Libyan authorities in 
early 2017 was also a move by the then Prime Minister 
Paolo Gentiloni to show that the government was acting, 
and to prevent a shift of votes to the far right Lega or the 
populist Five Star Movement in the upcoming election.32 
This strategy has not paid off. The current government 
formed by a coalition of these two forces has doubled 
down on already weak migration flows in a rhetorical 
battle with the EU institutions and other member states.
The distorting effect of domestic 
migration-oriented political goals on 
foreign policy undermines efforts to 
effectively manage borders in the 
longer run.
The distorting effect of domestic migration-oriented 
political goals on foreign policy undermines efforts to 
effectively manage borders in the longer run. The case 
of Libya shows that quick fixes are not solutions, and 
points to three key lessons learned, along with necessary 
adjustments to the current strategy and policies:
sharply since 2017,28 the country’s security crisis 
continues to unfold and the roots of instability have 
not been adequately addressed. In practice, the policy 
record so far indicates that creating the conditions 
for stabilisation to take hold and last has not been 
prioritised. The actions put in place signal that the 
aim to unify and stabilise Libya, which is ultimately 
key to managing migration and borders, has not 
been consistently pursued and sometimes relies on 
diplomatic adventurism.
Policies and instruments that are dominated by security 
and migration-related concerns risk being detrimental 
to achieving long-term stability. Overcoming the war 
economy is the most important step in stabilising Libya, 
rather than reinforcing militias and warlords by dealing 
with them to curb migration flows. Additionally, efforts 
to strengthen local governance can be undermined 
if the diplomatic track does not achieve its goals of 
political reconciliation; the establishment of an agreed 
framework for security and law enforcement at national 
level; and the redistribution of economic resources. 
Failing to address these challenges in a holistic way, 
as a shared EU priority, risks undermining efforts and 
wasting resources. 
There is a need for a comprehensive approach to address 
the south of Libya too.  This will not only involve setting 
up facilities and capacity-building, but also engaging 
with the border communities. Firstly, it should provide 
alternative economic development opportunities for the 
large portion of the workforce that is currently reliant 
on illicit business. Secondly, it must focus on political 
integration and the empowerment of minorities such as 
the Tebu and Tuareg tribes that have high stakes in this 
system but are excluded from Libyan nationality. 
At the same time, the reduction in the number of 
migrants arriving in Europe has been accompanied by 
reports of human rights abuses in Libya,29 combined with 
dire reception conditions. The human rights situation 
of migrants in the country has also been deteriorating 
as a result of policies intended to stop the flows.  In 
addition, and particularly since the introduction of 
new policies by the Italian government as of June 2018, 
these trends have also coincided with an increase in the 
number of casualties and those missing at sea.30 These 
developments, and the worsening security situation, 
suggest that looking at Libya mainly from a migration 
perspective may deepen the underlying causes of 
instability in the long run.
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q Lesson 1 – reassessing priorities. Insecurity in Libya 
is a push factor for migration. While the measures 
taken so far have contributed to the short-term 
reduction of flows of migrants and asylum-seekers, 
these will not stop. Even with heightened risks of 
death when crossing the Mediterranean due to a 
reduced number of search and rescue operations, 
people will attempt to reach Europe’s shores. Political 
stabilisation is therefore not only key to addressing 
migrants’ humanitarian needs, but also to creating a 
context where at least a proportion of such migrants 
can continue to live and work in Libya. Priorities 
need to be reassessed. Addressing the war economy, 
of which human smuggling is a component, will 
certainly help stabilise the country by reducing 
the power of organised crime and militias, and by 
providing opportunities for better governance. These 
efforts should start with inclusivity in the political 
and security negotiation process and feature the 
unification of national economic institutions.  
 
Political negotiations should be as representative as 
possible and not only involve the most high-level 
actors. Up to now, disputes involving economic 
institutions such as the National Oil Company (NOC), 
the Central Bank (CBL) and the Libyan Investment 
Authority (LIA) have fuelled competition for control of 
state revenues and assets and the creation of parallel 
institutions. For example, the CBL has been divided 
into rival branches in the west and east. The struggle 
for control over the NOC and the CBL is continuous 
and creates constant obstacles to their functioning.33 
In this context, greater support for the unification of 
these institutions and an end to disputes over them 
should be treated as a priority. The economic reforms 
introduced by the GNA in September 2018 must be 
supported, but at the same time European partners 
should help the Libyan authorities in addressing flaws 
that have been identified by international experts, 
such as the need to devaluate the dinar and provide 
a better scheme for scaling down subsidies.34 Efforts 
should also involve increasing investigative capacity 
throughout the migration route. The expansion 
of the mandate of Operation Sophia to seize 
ships illegally smuggling oil products is a positive 
development in this direction. However, greater 
efforts should be made to address criminal activities 
in Libya in a comprehensive manner, rather than by 
compartmentalising distinct criminal activities.  
q Lesson 2 – bridging the gap between objectives and 
actions. The gap between aspirations on the one hand, 
and the capacity or willingness to achieve them on the 
other, emerges in different areas of EU policy responses 
to the Libya crisis. For example, the EU wishes to 
promote stabilisation and political reconciliation, but 
makes relatively little effort to do so. Similarly, it aims 
to limit migration, but introduces temporary solutions 
that risk deepening the problem and making it more 
complex. This gap creates unrealistic expectations 
among local partners, as well as European audiences.35  
 
If the EU wishes to be seen as a credible actor, it 
should re-evaluate its own instruments and their 
fitness to achieve its objectives. For example, the 
focus on training the Libyan coast and border guard to 
contain migration flows, instead of the introduction 
of long-term security arrangements – in particular 
the progressive demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR) of militia members – exposes this 
gap. While the co-option of militias may appear to be 
a suitable way of bringing armed groups under control, 
this is not the same as demobilising and integrating 
them into a national security apparatus – which 
was one of the central goals of the Libyan Political 
Agreement. Instead, the warlords have been 
strengthened through co-option because their agenda, 
their organisational structure and their stake in the 
war economy have remained unchanged. Given the 
inextricable links between control over economic assets 
and conflict, these militias must not be provided with a 
lifeline and legitimacy.  
 
Recent developments on the ground seem to offer 
a window of opportunity to reopen negotiations 
between opposing factions which could lead to 
progress in DDR too.36 In this context, an international 
conference on Libya is scheduled to take place in 
Palermo in November 2018 on the initiative of the 
Italian government. This will provide an opportunity to 
establish a new roadmap for reconciliation. At the time 
of writing, it is not yet clear who will participate on the 
Libyan side, and how many participants will represent 
local authorities and the different institutions. Two 
factors will be crucial to the success of the conference. 
Firstly, key Libyan factions must be represented. 
Secondly, the international community needs to join 
forces to push the Libyan counterparts into finding 
an agreement. At a European level, this can only be 
achieved if the EU and its member states adopt a 
unified approach in their policies towards Libya. Recent 
Foreign Affairs Council conclusions in support of the 
Palermo conference seem to suggest a move in this 
direction,37 but it is too early to predict whether these 
will translate into tangible joint action. 
q Lesson 3 – raising conflict sensitivity. The EU needs 
to extend both its footprint and its communication 
beyond migration control, which is of limited domestic 
interest in Libya and thus lacks conflict sensitivity. At 
the same time, local stakeholders should be given the 
opportunity to inform the design of EU programmes 
and contribute to increasing their impact. Coherence 
and sustainability with an eye to the conflict dynamics 
should be prioritised. The role of municipalities 
is important but, beyond that, a wider range of 
representative actors on the ground should form a core 
element of projects and programmes where possible. 
Local discussions among tribal representatives and 
civil society activists are not enough. These should 
be accompanied by negotiations specifically aimed at 
bringing military commanders and leaders of armed 
groups together at a local level, then integrating 
them into a wider national security dialogue. So 
far, attempts to gather all security actors under the 
umbrella of a single security apparatus have not been 
successful. In the meantime, to pave the way for a 
nationwide security dialogue, the experience on the 
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1 Wehrey, Frederic and Wolfram Lacher (2018), “The Wrong Way to Fix Libya”, 
Foreign Affairs. 
2 Tripoli and its surroundings form the most densely populated part of Libya, 
followed by other coastal areas such as Benghazi and Misratah according 
to the latest census published by Libya’s Bureau of Statistics and Census. 
Such statistics can only be considered to be estimates in the current volatile 
situation, but the total national population is estimated to be about 6 million.
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ground suggests that, in some contexts, engaging with 
local armed groups under the supervision of civilian 
leadership  can provide some degree of security.38 
 
The south of the country is key to this process. Arab, 
Tebu and Tuareg tribes and armed groups should be 
involved in a national dialogue and the formation of a 
unified army with local legitimacy across the country. 
Resentment over unequal access to citizenship rights 
is one of the most significant factors contributing 
to insecurity in the south. Much of this stems 
from Mu’ammar Gaddafi’s cynical manipulation of 
tribal constituents in the south by promising them 
citizenship in exchange for service in his security forces. 
These promises never materialised and, combined with 
economic competition and institutional collapse, their  
legacy has been a major driver of conflict in the  
post-2011 era. 
Pursuing the measures described above would improve 
the coherence and effectiveness of the European 
approach to Libya, although it is important to emphasise 
that the complexity of the situation makes quick fixes 
elusive. Europe and the international community will 
have to show persistence in their pursuit of stability and 
none of the approaches proposed here will be effective 
in isolation. In particular, they cannot be separated from 
the diplomatic and political effort required to overcome 
the current political stalemate. The Libyan experience 
illustrates that attempts to externalise Europe’s 
migration policy and border management through 
relatively short-term programmes in third countries is 
ultimately short-sighted. Instead, investing in long-term 
stability, improved governance and institution-building 
will be central drivers to addressing the push factors and 
causes of migration.
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